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Abstract 
Trait-like Resting-State Brain Oscillations Predict 
Subsequent Problem-Solving Strategies 
 
Brian Albert Erickson 
 





People use different processing strategies to solve problems. Previous research 
distinguishes between solving problems by analysis, that is, in a conscious, deliberate 
manner, versus by insight, in which the solution appears abruptly in awareness (the 
“Aha” phenomenon) after a period of unconscious processing. Prior work provides little 
evidence whether the tendency to solve problems using one or the other of these 
strategies constitutes a stable, trait-like cognitive style. We tested this hypothesis by 
assessing whether individuals evince a consistent preference for a particular solving 
strategy across days and types of problems and whether these cognitive styles have neural 
correlates. We recorded participants’ resting-state electroencephalograms (EEGs) on 4 
occasions, approximately once per week. At the end of the third and fourth sessions, 
participants attempted to solve a series of short verbal problems (compound remote 
associates during session 3 and anagrams during session 4). Based on participants’ trial-
by-trial reports of the manner in which they solved anagram problems, individuals were 
categorized as predominantly relying on an insight or an analytic solving strategy. The 
resting-state EEGs of these groups, recorded during previous sessions were compared. 
Participants in the analytic group showed greater EEG beta power over midline and right 
inferior-frontal regions compared to insightful participants; participants in the insightful 
group showed greater beta power over left superior parietal cortex compared to those in 
the analytic group. Group differences in solving strategy and resting-state EEGs assessed 
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with anagram problems generalized to the compound remote associates problems. 
Overall, these results demonstrate the behavioral and neural consistency of these 
cognitive styles over both time and type of problem. The finding that insightful solvers 
exhibited a lower ratio of frontal to parietal neural activity supports the hypothesis that 
insightfulness results from chronic relative frontal hypoactivation and concomitant 
parietal disinhibition whereas analytic solvers exhibit chronic relative frontal 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Two individuals confronted with the same problem may use different strategies to reach 
identical solutions. The term cognitive style refers to individual differences in the 
tendency to favor particular processing modes or strategies. In the domain of problem 
solving, at least two general cognitive styles have been identified: analytic solving 
involves conscious, deliberate thought and insightful solving involves unconscious 
processing leading up to the sudden emergence into conscious of an idea or solution (i.e. 
the “Aha!” phenomenon; Kounios & Beeman, 2014).  
Cognitive styles may be thought of as features of personality (Nickerson, 1999; Feist, 
1999). The concept of personality includes the recurrence of particular perceptual modes, 
thoughts, and behaviors in response to similar events or situations. Behavior and internal 
experience are generated by the brain.  Therefore, personality traits are driven by 
individual differences in neural architecture or recruitment (DeYoung & Gray, 2009). For 
example, the traits of the “Big Five” factor model (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1990) have 
well-established neural correlates including regional gray matter volume and functional 
architecture (DeYoung, et al., 2011; Adelstien, et al., 2011; Kumari, Williams, & Gray, 
2004).  
Personality traits derived from questionnaires such as the Big Five have the benefits of 
reliability and generality. However, because personality traits are based on self-reports 
about broad classes of behavior and experience, they are arguably a “blunt instrument” in 
that they do not isolate component mental processes. At present, the neural basis that 
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predicts what strategy an individual will use when faced with a particular type of problem 
is poorly understood. The study of cognitive style addresses this issue through the 
development of tasks that, despite having definite solutions, leave subjects free to 
approach the problem through their preferred strategy. 
1.2: Creative versus Analytic Cognitive Style 
Creative and analytic thought are examples of two processing modes or strategies which 
can often be applied to the same problem with equally satisfactory results. Little is known 
about the neural drivers that cause individuals to favor one or the other of these cognitive 
styles. To begin, it is necessary to understand the relationship between creativity and 
analysis in problem solving. 
Analytic strategies are those that rely on deliberate, conscious manipulation of problem 
elements, as in hypothesis testing. Many studies of problem solving in cognitive science 
are implicitly studies of analysis – for instance, many basic math and logic problems fit 
this definition (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958). The construct of creativity is less 
constrained. Most classic creativity tasks involve complex, multistep problems 
susceptible to order effects and the probable inclusion of significant analytic processing. 
This complicates the development of a task that contrasts creative and analytic thinking.  
This issue can be addressed by operationalizing creativity as the phenomenon of insight. 
Insight is generally understood to be a manifestation of creative cognition and has the 
advantage of a consensus definition (which is not the case for creativity in general). 
Insight is experienced as an “aha!” phenomenon in which a solution is suddenly available 
and seems obviously correct, without conscious awareness of intermediate steps 
(Kounios & Smith, 1995). Insight and analytic strategies are generally understood to be 
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opposing constructs relying on different thought patterns (Mrazek, Smallwood, & 
Schooler, 2012) which may sometimes coexist in parallel. 
1.2.1: The History of Insight 
Insight has been a topic of interest since antiquity, but became a topic of scientific study 
only in the early 20th century.  Behaviorists such as Edward Thorndike viewed learning 
and problem solving as a trial-and-error process in which response tendencies are 
gradually strengthened by rewards or weakened by punishments.  In contrast, the Gestalt 
psychologists recognized that the behaviorist view is insufficient, as shown by studies 
that demonstrated discrete, all-or-none transformations in visual perception.  
Furthermore, Wolfgang Kőhler's studies of problem solving in apes demonstrated what 
appeared to be sudden insights in problem solving (Köhler, 1925).  One of his studies 
involved placing a bunch of bananas behind a fence out of the reach of a chimpanzee.  
Two bamboo sticks were available to the chimp, but neither was long enough to reach the 
bananas and pull them within reach.  After a period of frustration and inaction, the chimp 
spontaneously arrived at the solution, namely, jamming one stick into the other – bamboo 
shafts are hollow – to make a longer rod that could be used to reach the bananas.  
Importantly, the chimpanzee had not been rewarded for intermediate steps that would 
have brought him incrementally closer to achieving this solution, such as holding both 
sticks at the same time or knocking them together.  The use and construction of the tool 
apparently came to the chimpanzee suddenly and all at once – an insight.  
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1.2.2: Classic Insight Problems 
Gestalt psychologists went on to demonstrate similar examples of insightful problem 
solving in humans.  Their methodology was based on a corpus of “insight problems” that 
typically elicit an “Aha!” experience when they are solved. A famous example is the 
Nine-Dot Problem, a simple puzzle that nevertheless results in nearly total failure to solve 
in standard laboratory studies (Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004). A square grid of 9 dots is 
presented with instructions to connect all the dots using four straight contiguous lines and 
without retracing a line segment or lifting the pencil from the paper (Maier, 1930). 
Subjects typically approach this problem by testing every unique pattern of lines that 
satisfy the instructions before reaching a point at which no novel solutions are generated 
for an extended period (impasse; Erickson & Kounios, 2013). Impasse reflects an 
exhaustive exploration of the current problem space (the set of all problem states 
satisfying the task instructions) that nevertheless does not yield a viable solution. Impasse 
occurs on some problems when solvers impose implicit assumptions on the problem 
space, rendering the solution inaccessible. These implicit limitations often arise from past 
experience or gestalt perceptual phenomena. For instance, the Nine-Dot Problem hinges 
on perception of the dots as forming a bounded box. Reaching a solution requires 
recognizing and relaxing this implicit assumption, also known as restructuring the 
problem representation. Sometimes a hint can facilitate this restructuring. (The Nine-Dot 
Problem is apparently the origin of the phrase “think outside the box”; see Appendix A.) 
Restructuring is a sudden process associated with a feeling of certainty either that a now-
obvious specific solution is correct or more generally that a newly discovered class of 
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viable problem states contains a correct solution and only the details of implementation 
remain to be worked out.  
1.2.3. Issues with the Corpus of Classic Insight Problems 
Classic insight problems assume that insight is required to reach their solutions and, 
therefore, that all solutions to this class of problems occur through insight. The Gestalt 
psychologists also assumed that insight requires several steps (e.g., preparation, 
incubation, intimation, illumination, and verification; Wallas, 1926. However, a deeper 
investigation of “in-vivo” insight reveals that at least some of these assumptions are 
sufficient but not necessary to produce the feeling of insight. Specifically, insight can 
strike when no problem has been presented, or may be only tangentially related to a 
problem under consideration. In these scenarios the problem space is unbounded, and 
thus there can be no impasse. Classic insight problems may also be solved in a more 
stepwise “constraint relaxation” method that fails to elicit the quintessential insight 
“aha!” experience (Danek, Wiley, & Öllinger, 2016). Thus, the assumption that strong 
insight is being recruited to access a solution by problem design is insufficient. Indeed, 
one of the main limitations with the Gestalt psychologists’ research on insight was that it 
relied on an informal consensus regarding which problems were to be considered insight 
problems and which would be considered analytic problems. Additionally, failure to 
solve a classic insight problem could occur for many reasons, not limited to lack of 
insightful processing ability.  
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1.2.4: Insight/Analytic Self-Report Problems 
For the reasons outlined above, it is difficult to classify problems as exclusively insightful 
or analytic. In fact the primary objective difference between insight and analytical 
processing is not the structure of the problem, but the experience of a solution occurring 
suddenly and unexpectedly (Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987). This logic led to the development 
of a more recent approach in which subjects are directly asked about their experience 
after solving puzzles. 
Anagram problems are one example of puzzles that have been studied with this method 
(Vincent, Goldberg, & Titone, 2006). An anagram is a string of letters that must be 
rearranged to form a word. Prior to presentation of anagrams, subjects are briefed on the 
characteristics that define an insight solutions (sudden awareness) versus analytic 
solutions (hypothesis testing, trial-and-error guessing, deliberate strategy). After each 
solved anagram, subjects are asked to report which strategy (insightful or analytic) they 
experienced during the solution. Interestingly, the distribution of reported strategies 
varies widely across subjects with some subjects reporting almost exclusive use of insight 
or analysis (Erickson & Kounios, 2013). 
The neural and behavioral correlates of self-reported insight and analytic strategies have 
been studied with anagrams and other simple word-problems for over two decades 
(Kounios & Smith, 1995; Bowden & Beeman, 1998; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios 
et al., 2006; Kounios et al., 2008; Subramaniam, Kounios, Parrish, & Jung-Beeman, 
2009; Salvi, Bricolo, Franconeri, Kounios, & Beeman, 2015), validating participant 
reports as reflecting behaviorally and neurologically relevant features. Anagrams can be 
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designed to have only one solution, so that only solution strategy varies across problems. 
Moreover, subjects can easily tolerate completing dozens of anagrams in one session. 
These features make anagram problems ideal for analysis of the neural bases of insight 
versus analytic cognitive style. 
1.3: Neural Signatures of Cognitive Style 
Like all factors of personality and behavior, cognitive style is a function of neurology. 
Because cognitive styles are traitlike patterns of behavior, their contribution to neural 
activity should be present over multiple recordings. This raises multi-session resting-state 
(RS) brain activity as a candidate for exploration. Between 40 and 50% of the variance in 
RS-EEG hemispheric asymmetry is consistent over multiple recording sessions 
(Hagemann, Naumann, Thayer, & Bartussek, 2002; Hagemann, Hewig, Seifert, 
Naumann, & Bartussek, 2005), and some RS-EEG power and frequency features have 
been demonstrated to remain stable over a timescale of days, weeks, or longer (Meindl et 
al., 2010; John, Prichep, Fridman, & Easton, 1988; Salinsky, Oken, & Morehead, 1991; 
Gasser, Bächer, & Steinberg, 1985).  
Resting state features have also been shown to correlate with other traitlike factors 
including the Big Five (Kunisato et al., 2011), general fluid intelligence (gF; Finn et al., 
2015), and psychiatric classifications (Goodkind et al., 2015). RS activity has been 
directly linked to on-task recordings. fMRI classification algorithms can identify a 
subject’s on-task recordings from an anonymous database using only a sample RS 
recording, demonstrating that substantial variance is shared between RS and task-related 
activity (Finn et al., 2015). It is even possible to transform RS fMRI into accurate 
predictions of task-related activity (Tavor et al., 2016). Since trait-RS activity contains a 
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great deal of information about a subject’s on-task cognition, it may be a fruitful place to 
look for signatures of the cognitive styles individuals will employ when faced with a 
problem. 
1.4: The Present Study 
Identification of differences in trait RS-EEG related to subjects’ reliance on an insight 
versus analytic problem solving strategy could help to uncover the neural basis of this 
cognitive style, and perhaps shed light on the constituent insightful and analytic mental 
processes themselves. Additionally, it would validate this methodology for the detection 
of similar trait RS dependencies of other constituent processes of cognitive style. 
Thus, the present study used an anagram task to assess subjects’ insight versus analytic 
solving strategy preferences and link them to RS-EEG. Three sessions of RS-EEG were 
collected and averaged within-subject to isolate trait RS-EEG. Subjects then completed 
an anagram task, and their I/A ratio was used to sort them into primarily-insightful and 
primarily-analytical groups. These groups’ RS-EEG data was submitted to statistical 
analysis to determine scalp regions and frequency bands in which solvers who relied on 
insight had significantly different trait RS-EEG activity from solvers who relied on 
analysis. 
Importantly, because all of the RS-EEG data included in the analysis were recorded prior 
to presentation of anagrams, significant differences revealed by this method are 
predictive; that is, they show that RS-EEG predicts solvers’ reliance on an insightful or 
analytic cognitive style on a subsequent day. In a supplementary analysis, significant 
scalp-frequency clusters from the main analysis were compared to solvers’ reliance on 
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insight or analysis from a related type of problem, compound remote associates (CRAs), 
to explore the generalizability of the revealed trait RS-EEG predictors. These analyses 
explore traitlike RS-EEG features of cognitive problem-solving style.  
Trait resting state predicts cognitive style 17 
Chapter 2: Methods 
 
2.1: Subjects 
Experimental protocols were approved by the Drexel University Institutional Review 
Board. Participants were recruited via fliers posted on the Drexel and University of 
Pennsylvania campuses. Subjects were prescreened to confirm that they were native 
English speakers; between the ages of 18 and 33; right-handed; had no diagnosed 
neurological conditions or learning disabilities; had normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and hearing; had no symptoms of psychiatric conditions in the previous year; had no open 
head wounds or implants; and additionally, on each day of testing had not used any drugs 
or medications affecting brain function and had not consumed excessive alcohol for at 
least 24 hours prior to testing; and had adequate sleep the previous night. Each subject 
gave informed consent and verbally confirmed these criteria on the first day of testing, 
and subsequent sessions for relevant questions. Fifty-one right-handed, native English-
speakers (27 male, 24 female) participated in the study. They ranged in age from 18 to 29 
years of age (M = 20.69, SD = 2.97). Of these, 5 were excluded for failing to follow 
directions during one or more of the experimental tasks, 3 were excluded for solving 
fewer than 20% of the problems, 2 were excluded for excessive EEG artifact, and 1 was 
excluded for abnormally high EEG alpha activity (i.e., more than 3 SD greater than the 
mean of the sample). 
2.2 Experimental Design 
Subjects participated in 4 sessions on 4 separate days with approximately one-week 
separating consecutive sessions. Each session took from 1.5 to 2.5 hours. At the 
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beginning of each session, 10 minutes of resting-state EEG was recorded (see Resting-
State EEG Collection). This was followed by administration of the PANAS mood 
questionnaire (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The remaining questionnaires and 
activities varied across sessions. Instructional videos were presented with Microsoft 
PowerPoint; surveys were completed through Google Forms; and all other tasks were 
designed and administered with E-Prime 2.0. All stimuli were presented on a ViewSonic 
Graphics Series G790 monitor. Subjects were compensated $15/hour, paid at the end of 
each session.  
On the first day, participants first filled out three questionnaires: the Morning-
Eveningness Questionnaire (MEQ; Horne & Ostberg, 1975) to determine preference for 
and propensity to be active at different periods of the day; the Edinburgh Handedness 
inventory (Oldfield, 1971); and demographics. On the second day, EEG was recorded 
while participants completed a computer-based attention task (see Eriksen Flanker Task). 
Following that, they were disconnected from the EEG equipment in order to fill out the 
Creativity Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005) and 
the Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA; Goff, 2002). On the third day, 
participants’ EEG was recorded while they solved compound-remote associates problems 
(see CRAs). On the fourth day, EEG was recorded while participants completed a set of 
anagrams (see Anagrams). Each EEG task was preceded by instructions to relax and 
avoid artifact-inducing movements and eye activity.  
As our strategy for revealing trait-like RS predictors of cognitive style relied on 
correlating RS-EEG recorded during sessions 1-3 with the problem-solving performance 
on the session 4 anagram task. It was therefore important to avoid biasing subjects’ brain 
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activity during the RS-EEG recordings. Since the RS-EEG recording preceded the event-
related task in each session, RS data from sessions 1-3 could not have been biased by the 
expectation of having to solve problems. Thus, the central results include only these first 
3 RS-EEG sessions; session 4 RS data are included in some ancillary analyses. 
2.3 Eriksen Flanker Task 
The attention task given on Day 2 of testing was modeled after a study by Rowe, Hirsh, 
& Anderson (2007) in which subjects were asked to identify the center letter in a row of 
seven letters. Participants were told that this was a “reaction time task” and that they 
should identify the center letter as quickly as possible.  Participants first viewed a video 
describing the Flanker task and procedure with the script: 
“The next part of the experiment will test your reaction time. We will monitor your 
button press responses in addition to the brain activity associated with each response. 
First, we’ll explain the instructions and give you some time to practice before beginning 
the experiment. If you have a question at any time prior to the beginning of the 
experiment, please ask. We want the instructions to be as clear as possible! You will only 
be using the mouse in this experiment. Hold it with both hands as shown here. Whenever 
you need to press the left button, use your left thumb. When you need to press the right 
button, use your right thumb. At the beginning of each trial, you will see a plus sign in 
the center of the screen. When you see this plus sign, keep your eyes fixed on it. Seven 
letters will appear. Try to pay attention only to the center letter and ignore the 6 
“distractors” appearing to the left and right of the center. If the center letter is a K, press 
the left mouse button. If the center letter is an S, press the right mouse button. Respond as 
soon as you identify the center letter. Responding quickly is just as important as 
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responding accurately. The center letter and the distractors will change from trial to trial. 
They might match but they might not. Remember that your button press depends ONLY 
on the center letter. So in this example, you would press the right button. In this one, you 
would press the left button. If you get an answer wrong, you will see “error” appear on 
the screen for a few seconds before the computer moves onto the next trial. You will only 
receive feedback for incorrect answers. When you answer correctly, the computer will 
just move onto the next trial without any message. Now you’re ready to begin the 
practice trials! If you have any questions, you can ask now or at any time while you’re 
practicing.” 
All text including stimuli was written in white font against a very dark gray background 
(RGB: 38, 38, 38). Participants viewed a fixation cross for 500 ms before the stimulus 
was displayed on the screen. Each stimulus consisted of seven letters: either S or K. 
Participants were instructed to press the left mouse button if the center letter was a “K” 
and the right mouse button if the center letter was an “S.” Half of the stimuli were 
flanked by response-compatible letters (e.g. “K” in the middle of six other “K”) and half 
of the stimuli were flanked by response-incompatible letters (e.g. “K” in the middle of six 
“S”). Additionally, half of the stimuli were closely spaced (e.g. “KKKKKKK”) and half 
of the stimuli were distantly spaced (e.g. “K K K S K K K”). Combining these factors 
allowed for eight different possible stimuli, which were used for eight practice trials and 
randomly repeated for 480 experimental trials. If the participant answered incorrectly, 
“error” appeared on the screen for 500 ms. If the participant answered correctly, a blank 
screen was displayed for 500 ms. A fixation cross was displayed during the intertrial 
time, which randomly varied between 500, 600, 700, or 800 ms so that participants would 
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answer as quickly as possible rather than falling into a rhythm. The experimental trials 
were broken into three blocks of 160 trials with breaks of about 60 seconds between each 
block. For trials in which the letters were closely-spaced, the visual angle between each 
letter was .06 degrees. For distantly-spaced letters, the visual angle was .5 degrees. This 
was for letters of about .48 degrees of height. 
2.4 Compound Remote Associates 
Participants first viewed a video detailing the experimental procedure for compound 
remote associates (CRA) problems (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003) and defining insight 
and methodical experiences: 
“This is a task that examines problem solving.  Before each trial begins, you will see a 
fixation cross on the computer screen. You determine when each problem will be 
presented to you by clicking both mouse buttons at the same time. Use your left thumb 
for the left button and your right thumb for the right button, as shown here. Before 
clicking the buttons to show that you are prepared, you should focus your attention and 
center your eyes on the fixation point in the center of the screen. Try not to move your 
eyes around. This is where the problem will appear. After you press the buttons to 
indicate that you are prepared, a word puzzle made up of 3 problem words will appear on 
the screen. Try to look at all of the words at once rather than each individual word—this 
will prevent unnecessary eye movements. Your job is to find a solution word that makes 
a familiar compound word or phrase with each of the problem words. The solution word 
could come before or after each of the problem words. The answer is “apple,” which 
combines with each of the problem words to form pineapple, crabapple and applesauce. 
Here’s another example.  What is the solution that can form a word or phrase with over, 
plant and horse?  The answer is ”power,” which generates overpower, horsepower, and 
power plant. In this example, two of the words are compound words, and the last is a 
compound phrase. Either is acceptable, as long as you are able to form a familiar word or 
phrase.  You will have 15 seconds to solve each word puzzle. As soon as you know the 
answer, simultaneously press both mouse buttons as quickly as possible. Responding 
quickly is as important as responding accurately. Remember to use your left thumb for 
the left button and your right thumb for the right button.  There is no rush to verbalize 
your response. You must wait until you see the solution prompt on the screen, and then 
you may say the solution aloud. If you do not come up with the solution to a word puzzle 
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after 15 seconds, the problem words will disappear from the screen and the fixation cross 
will reappear.  The computer will then move onto the next trial. If you do solve the 
problem, we want to know how you felt when you discovered the solution.  Specifically, 
we want to know if you solved the problem methodically or if you had a feeling of 
insight.  An insight is an "Aha!" feeling, characterized by suddenness and obviousness.  
You are not completely sure how you came up with it, but you are confident that it is the 
answer. The feeling of insight does not have to be overwhelming, but it should be 
something along these lines. A methodical thought process involves more deliberate 
processing. This commonly involves trial-and-error guessing; for example, you might 
have devised the word “applesauce” and then mentally placed “apple” alongside the other 
two problem words to form crabapple and pineapple. If you can remember how you 
arrived at a solution, then you used methodical thought processing. Most people 
interchange between insight and methodical strategies when solving word puzzles, and 
can easily determine which strategy they used. Use your intuition when deciding. If you 
experienced an “Aha!” feeling, please press the right button when the “Methodical” vs. 
“Insight” prompt appears. If you used methodical thought processing, press the left 
button. Try to use mostly these two responses, but if for some reason you are unsure and 
cannot decide, simply wait a few seconds and the experiment will automatically move 
onto the next trial. Keep in mind that this is not a test of intelligence, and these problems 
are intentionally difficult to solve.  Think of it as a challenge; press the button as quickly 
as possible when you think you know the solution, and have fun! 
A fixation cross was displayed at the beginning of each trial until participants clicked to 
initiate a problem. Upon button press, cross hairs appeared around the fixation cross in 
order to prepare the participants and focus their attention. After 1000 ms, three CRA 
problem words replaced the fixation cross within the cross hairs. The words were 
displayed in yellow, Courier New, 14-point font for up to 14 seconds. Participants were 
instructed to try to read all the words without moving their eyes. If they found an answer, 
they were to indicate that a solution had been found with another bimanual button press. 
Then “Solution?” appeared on the screen and the participants spoke the solution aloud, 
and the experimenter recorded whether or not the solution was correct. Then the 
participants indicated whether they had solved the problem by insight or analytically. 
Half of the participants indicated insight with their left thumbs while the other half 
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indicated insight with their right thumbs. In the rare cases where participants were unsure 
of the solution method they used, they did not press any buttons and after 4 seconds the 
solution method was recorded as “unsure.” Participants were told that insight problems 
were characterized by the “Aha!” experience. They were told that if they used trial-and-
error or some kind of method, then they solved the problem analytically, and that if they 
could remember how they arrived at a solution, they most likely used analysis. If the 
participant did not solve the problem within 14 seconds, then the fixation cross preceding 
the next trial was displayed. Participants could relax and refocus their attention for as 
long as desired while the fixation cross was displayed, and the procedure would only 
continue with another bimanual button press. This procedure was used for 12 practice 
trials followed by 153 experimental trials. 
2.5 Anagrams 
The anagrams task (Figure 1) was modeled on previously developed experiments 
(Kounios et al., 2006). Participants first viewed a video detailing the experimental 
procedure and defining insight and methodical experiences: 
“This is a task that examines problem solving.  Before each trial begins, you will see “Get 
Ready” and then a fixation cross on the computer screen. Then you will see an anagram 
on the screen.  For each anagram, we want you to come up with a word by rearranging 
the letters. For example, if you see the anagram “owlet”, you must try to rearrange the 
letters to make another word. The answer is “towel”. Here’s another example.  If you see 
the anagram “omits”, you must try to rearrange the letters to form “moist”. You must use 
all of the letters in the original anagram. You will have 16 seconds to solve each 
anagram. As soon as you know the answer, simultaneously press both mouse buttons as 
quickly as possible. Responding quickly is as important as responding accurately. After 
you make your response, a fixation cross will appear on the screen.  Please try to keep 
your eyes focused on the fixation until the “Solution” prompt appears.  There is no rush 
to verbalize your response. You must wait until you see the solution prompt on the 
screen, and then you can say the solution aloud. If you do not come up with the solution 
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to an anagram after 16 seconds, the anagram will disappear from the screen and the 
fixation cross will reappear.  The computer will then move onto the next trial. If you do 
solve the problem, we want to know how you felt when you discovered the solution.  
Specifically, we want to know if you had a feeling of insight.  An insight is an "Aha!" 
feeling, characterized by suddenness and obviousness.  You are not completely sure how 
you came up with it, but you are confident that it is the answer. The feeling of insight 
does not have to be overwhelming, but it should be something along these lines. 
Alternatively, you could solve the anagram methodically. This normally involves some 
kind of strategy, such as systematically rearranging the letters in particular patterns. Trial-
and-error guessing would also be considered methodical.  Even if you’re working on a 
problem methodically, a solution could pop into your awareness all of a sudden as an 
insight that is not a product of your conscious, deliberate thought. This would be 
considered an insight, not a methodical solution. If you experienced the “Aha!” feeling, 
please press the left button when the “Methodical or Insight” prompt appears. If you 
solved the anagram methodically, press the right button. Try to use mostly these two 
responses, but if for some reason you are unsure and cannot decide, simply wait a few 
seconds and the computer will automatically move onto the next trial. Keep in mind that 
this is not a test of intelligence, and these problems are intentionally difficult to solve.  
Think of it as a challenge; press the buttons as quickly as possible when you think you 
know the solution, and have fun!  
Before each trial, participants saw “Get ready” in red text against a dark grey screen for 
two seconds. A fixation point appeared for 500 ms before the anagram appeared. The 
anagram remained on the screen for 16 seconds or until the participant found a solution. 
If a solution was found, participants pressed both mouse buttons with their thumbs at the 
same time. If there were more than 500 ms between the two button presses, the 
participant saw a dialogue box reading “You must click BOTH buttons at the SAME 
time.” Then the fixation point returned for 500 ms before “Solution?” appeared on the 
screen. Participants had four seconds to report whether they solved the anagram by 
insight or analytically. Half of the participants pressed the left mouse button to indicate 
insight and the right button to indicate analytical solutions; the other half pressed the left 
button to indicate analytical solutions and the right button to indicate insight. This 
procedure was used for 15 practice trials and 180 experimental trials. 






Figure 1: Anagrams trial procedure 
Time course of a single anagram trial, in seconds (s) and milliseconds (ms). After a 
fixation, ready screen, and fixation, the anagram stimulus was shown for 16s (timeout, at 
which point the next trial was initiated) or until the subject made a bimanual response 
button click (R-BM) indicating they had a solution. The subject was then prompted to 
verbally report the solution (here “basis”) and the experimenter scored the response (R-
S). A visual strategy prompt of the button mapping for insight and methodical (e.g., 
analytic) strategies immediately followed, lasting for 4s or until the subject responded 




2.6 Resting State 
Each experimental session began with a resting-state EEG recording. Participants were 
instructed to relax and allow their minds to wander freely during four 2.5-min blocks of 
alternating eyes-open and eye-closed EEG recordings (with eyes-open always first). 
There was a 20-sec break between each block. During the eyes-open blocks, participants 
gazed at a white fixation cross against a black background on a computer monitor. To 
help minimize eye movements during the eyes-closed blocks, participants were instructed 
to imagine that they were still fixating on the fixation cross.  
2.7 EEG Acquisition and Data Preprocessing 
84-channel electroencephalographic data were acquired using silver silver-chloride 
electrodes embedded in a nylon cap (MANSCAN system, SAM Technology, Inc., San 
Francisco, CA) using International 10-20 system locations with additional electrodes and 
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linked-mastoid reference. Preprocessing was performed in MATLAB 7.14 (Mathworks, 
Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, USA) using functions from the EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme 
& Makeig, 2004). Data within eyes condition were merged for each session and 
bandpass-filtered from 2 to 55 Hz. Data were regularly epoched at 1-second intervals, 
and bad channels were removed by visual inspection of the time course and FFT. Data 
were passed through a semi-automatic artifact detection tool (Delorme, Sejnowski, & 
Makeig, 2007), and epochs were classified as clean or artifactual by the following 
methods: threshold (+/- 300mV), joint-probability (channel/global limit 5SD/3SD), 
kurtosis (6.5SD/3SD) and spectral profile (exceeding -100 to 25db over 20 to 55Hz), 
followed by manual review. These parameters were tuned to detect primarily very large 
artifacts and electromyographic (EMG) activity - the removal of which improves ICA 
decomposition quality - while retaining stereotypical artifacts such as eye blinks and eye 
movements for correction by independent components analysis (ICA). ICA weights were 
calculated using EEGLAB’s FASTICA algorithm. The ADJUST toolbox (Mognon, 
Jovicich, Bruzzone, & Buiatti, 2011) was used to automatically detect and remove 
artifactual ICA components representing blinks, eye movements and spatial 
discontinuities. ADJUST detections were limited to the third of the components with the 
highest mutual information to ensure that only reliable and important components were 
removed. The remaining components were manually reviewed. Data were then passed 
through the semi-automatic artifact detection tool again with more conservative 
parameters: threshold (+/- 40mV), joint-probability (channel/global limit 4SD/3SD), 
kurtosis (6.5SD/2SD) and spectral profile (exceeding -100 to 25db over 20 to 55 Hz), 
followed by manual review. Channels previously removed were then recovered through 
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interpolation. EEG data were preprocessed using ICA artifact correction and manual 
review in EEGLAB 12. Analyses were conducted in the SPM12 M/EEG toolbox (Litvak 
et al., 2011). The FFT of 1s regularly epoched sensor-level RS data was calculated from 2 
to 50 Hz in frequency steps of 2 Hz (Hamming windowed), robust averaged and log 
transformed within session.  
2.8 SPM Model Structure 
Spectral data were averaged within-session and log transformed, and transformed to 3D 
Scalp x Frequency .nii format images ([x,y], mm; [z], Hz). All SPM analyses were 
conducted at sensor-level. Importantly, SPM images were Z-transform normalized within 
frequency step, across electrodes. EEG absolute power within frequency bands varies 
between subjects due to variations in skull thickness and white/gray matter density which 
affect cortical signal power (Smit, Boomsma, Schnack, Hulshoff Pol & de Geus, 2012) as 
well as individual differences. Z-transformed relative power has been shown to correlate 
more closely with PET perfusion than absolute power (Cook, O’Hara, Uijtdehaage, 
Mandelkern, & Leuchter, 1998) and improves the validity of between-subject 
comparisons. 
There are several possible methods for computing statistical parametric maps, including 
one sample, two-sample and paired models. All of these models are simplifications of the 
flexible factorial (flexfac) model. The flexfac model allows inputting of multiple scans 
(scalp-frequency image files) per subject. Each scan is associated with a matrix of binary 
or integer values specifying which condition it represents. In this study, each scan was 
assigned a value for group (insight, analytic) eyes condition (open, closed); day of testing 
(1-4); and gender (M,F). The flexible factorial model partitions between and within-
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subject error. Depending on whether the subject term is included in the model, either the 
between or within-subject error term will be used to compute the F-statistic. Because day 
of testing and eyes condition are within-subject effects, flexfac models testing these 
factors (as confounds) included the “subject” factor. Tests on the gender confound and 
the main effect of group are between-subject effects and do not include the subject term. 
The flexfac method is more sensitive than comparable options, such as two-sample or 
regression tests on within-subject averages, as it both partitions within and between 
subject variance and models confound variables. 
2.9 Grouping 
Subjects in the middle of the distribution of I/A ratios do not strongly represent either 
group, and could have moved to one side or the other with very little change in their 
number of solutions. This makes median split ineffective at defining well differentiated 
groups (Kozhevnikov, 2007). To isolate groups with the greatest potential to reveal 
different solution-style related RS-EEG patterns, we calculated the log ratio of the 
number of anagram insight solutions to the number of analytic solutions (I/A ratio) and 
removed subjects representing the middle quintile of the distribution of this ratio. The 
remaining subjects formed the Insight and Analytical groups. 
CRAs also have an insight – analytic judgement, and could have been used to group 
subjects. CRAs were not used for two reasons. First, CRA accuracy was fairly low 
(averaging 51% across included subjects). Insight analytic ratios are unstable when 
solution counts are very low (<10), meaning that one more or fewer solution of either 
type would dramatically change the ratio. This issue is compounded by the explicit focus 
of this analysis on the most extreme subjects. The much higher anagrams task accuracies 
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(averaging 71%) resulted in much more stable ratios. Secondly, because the anagrams 
task was delivered on day 3 before any mention of creativity or insight versus analytic 
judgements, during anagrams subjects were relatively naïve. Response bias may have 
increased on day 4 (CRAs) due to the intervening period in which subjects may have 
contemplated the insight analytic judgement. 
Gender was balanced across all participants included in the final analysis, but not 
between-groups. As the genders were ultimately shown to vary significantly in their 
anagram I/A ratio (p=.038) across all subjects, between-group gender balancing would 
have unavoidably conflicted with and critically weakened I/A group construction. Gender 
was instead included and explored as a covariate in an SPM flexible factorial model. 
2.9 Hypotheses 
 2.9.1: Strategic Consistency: since I/A ratio is purported to index a consistent 
cognitive style trait, different problem-solving tasks should elicit similar I/A ratios. 
Therefore, I/A ratios for the CRA task were expected to correlate with those from the 
Anagrams task. 
 2.9.2: PANAS group differences: Prior work has shown that positive mood 
predicts higher I/A ratios, consistent with a body of work linking creative cognition and 
positive mood (Subramaniam et al., 2009). Therefore, PANAS scores were expected to 
be higher for the insight groups than for the analytic group across sessions. 
 2.9.3: Resting-state group differences: it was hypothesized that contrasts of RS-
EEG data by group membership would reveal clusters of significant differences. Specific 
predictions about the scalp-frequency profile of significant differences were not made. It 
Trait resting state predicts cognitive style 30 
was expected that RS-data would differ by eye condition over frontal-temporal and 
occipital regions, but that eye condition would not interact with group differences 
(Hagemann et al., 2002).   
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Chapter 3: Results 
3.1: Intersession Period 
To ensure that the analysis represented a durable, traitlike factor, the inter-session period 




Table 1: Days elapsed between sessions by group 
Time elapsed between sessions, averaged within and between subjects by group. 
 
 Insightfuls Analytics 
 mean ± SD mean ± SD 





Subjects completed the PANAS mood questionnaire on each day of testing immediately 
after resting-state EEG recording. Consistent with prior work linking mood, insight and 
creativity, we found a significant difference between the insight and analytic groups on 
day one through three average PANAS scores (p=.022; three-day averages were used to 
maintain consistency with the main analysis). This result suggests several possible 
relationships between trait RS-EEG, mood and I/A ratio. Most simply, the content or 
degree of subjects’ mind-wandering could transiently bias mood immediately prior to 
collection of PANAS data; in this case, mood acts as an intermediate variable between 
trait factors and I/A ratio. Alternatively, an independent trait bias in mood valence could 
have more complicated interactive effects on RS-EEG, PANAS scores and/or I/A ratio. 
Our experimental design did not permit full exploration of these relationships because 
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PANAS data was only collected once per session. However, any potential confounding 
effect of mood was explored by entering Anagram I/A ratio and day 1 to 3 averaged 
PANAS scores as covariates against day 1 to 3 within-subject RS-EEG averages. In this 
model, no clusters survived an F-test of the main effect of mood or mood*I/A ratio 
interaction with a standard cluster forming threshold p_clust = .001. Thus, while the 
source and effect of I/A related differences in mood remains uncertain, in our data they 
do not predict RS-EEG or interact with RS-EEG prediction of I/A ratio.  
3.3: Morning-Eveningness Questionnaire 
Subjects completed the MEQ on their first day of testing. The MEQ scores participants 
on their preference for and propensity to be active at different periods of the day. A 
significant group difference was observed on scores of the morning-eveningness 
questionnaire, p=.011, indicating that insightfuls prefer morning activities relative to 
analytics. These measurements scored insightfuls overall in the “neither” type, while 
analytics scored overall as “moderately evening” type. Despite the interesting group 
difference in this survey, our results are unlikely to be explained by morning or evening 
preference as sessions were scheduled almost exclusively for afternoons. MEQ 
differences in insightfuls and analytics is a promising topic for future analysis. 
3.4: Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
Since several components of our experimental design involved language function, 
subjects were prescreened with a question about their handedness and also performed the 
Edinburgh Handedness inventory on the first day of testing. All subjects were right 
handed, and the groups did not significantly differ in the extremity of their handedness 
(p=.248) 
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3.5: Anagram and CRA behavioral data 
3.5.1: Response Accuracies  
Mean response accuracies are shown in Table 2.  There were no significant group effects 
(Fs < 1.0).  Anagram insight/analytic ratio was not correlated with solving accuracy 
(r(32) = .05, t[1,30] = .274, p = .39; Figure 2a). CRA insight/analytic ratio was 
significantly positively correlated with solving accuracy (r(32) = .39, t[1,30] = 2.33, p = 






Figure 2: Correlation of solving accuracy and insight/analytic bias 
(A) Solving accuracy versus anagram I/A ratio for 32s (middle quintile removed). No 
correlation present. (B) Solving accuracy versus anagram I/A ratio for 42s (middle 
quintile retained). No significant correlation. Middle quintile variance is similar or equal 
to insightful and analytic groups. (C) Solving accuracy versus CRA I/A ratio (middle 
quintile removed). Moderate, significant (p = .01) correlation favoring insightfuls. (D) 
Solving accuracy versus CRA I/A ratio (middle quintile retained). Correlation is only 
slightly weakened. Added subjects are distributed across CRA I/A ratios since middle 
quintile is defined by anagram I/A ratio. 
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Table 2: Response timeouts and accuracies. 
Timeouts are the proportion of trials not generating a response in 16s. Accuracy was 
assessed as proportion of all trials and as a proportion of trials generating a response. No 
group effects were significant. 
 
 Insightfuls Analytics 
 Task – Anagrams  Task – CRAs Task – Anagrams Task – CRAs 
 mean ± SD mean ± SD mean ± SD mean ± SD 
% Timeout .28 ± .12 .54 ± .14 .28 ±	.11 .56 ±	.15 
% Correct of 
all trials .69 ± .12 .35 ± .08 .70 ±	.11 .32 ±	.10 
% Correct of 




3.5.2: Response Times 
Mean response times are shown in Table 3.  For both tasks, analytic solution times were 
slower than insight solution times.  Specifically, for the anagram task, a repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed a significant main effect of solution 
type (F[1,30] = 27.90, p < .001).  There were no significant group or group*solution-type 
effects (F[1,30] < .66, p = .43).  For the CRA task, there was also a significant main 
effect of solution type (F[1,30] = 19.20, p < .001).  The group effect approached 
significance (F[1,30] = 3.75, p = .06), but the group*solution-type interaction did not 












Table 3: Response times. 
Response time in milliseconds of the Insightful and Analytic groups on the anagram and 
CRA tasks, separated by insight and analytic response types, including correct and 
incorrect responses. 
 
 Insightfuls Analytics 
 Task - Anagrams  Task - CRAs Task - Anagrams Task - CRAs 
 mean ± SD mean ± SD mean ± SD mean ± SD 
Insight Response 
time (ms) 4950 ± 3684 5861 ± 2920 4465 ± 3688 5537 ± 2678 
Analytic Response 




3.6: Anagram SPM Results 
Three flexfac models were created to test the hypothesis of interest and confounding 
variables. Potential confounds were included in the final model if they produced a 
significant main effect or interacted with the Insightful/Analytic group variable. All tests 
on flexfac models were corrected at a cluster forming threshold of p<.001, which 
conforms to assumptions of Random Field Theory that may be violated with less 
conservative thresholds (Gehrig, Wibral, Arnold, & Kell, 2012). This parameter 
addresses concerns recently raised about the validity of random field theory multiple 
comparisons correction, upon which SPM methods rely (Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson, 
2016). 
The first model tested Gender as a potential confound, since this factor was not balanced 
across participants. Image files were entered into a between-subjects flexfac model with 
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factors Group (insightful/analytic) and Gender. No clusters survived a test of the main 
effect of Gender or the Group*Gender interaction; therefore, gender was not included in 
the final model. 
Second, a within-subjects flexfac model was created with factors Subject, Group, Eyes 
and Day. This design is valid for within-subject main effects and within-between factor 
interactions. An F-test revealed an expected main effect of Eyes condition in several 
broad clusters spanning multiple frequency ranges over occipital, parietal and frontal 
cortex (all clusters p<.0001). Follow-up directional t-tests confirmed greater broadband 
occipito-parietal activity in eyes-closed condition, versus greater broadband fronto-
temporal activity in eyes-open condition (Figure 3; all clusters p<.0001). Therefore, the 
eyes factor was retained in the final model. No Group*Eyes interaction was observed. No 
main effect of Day or Group*Day interaction was observed, so Day was not included in 
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Figure 3: SPM significance maps of flexible factorial contrast for eye condition main 
effect. 
Sagittal, coronal and transverse views of significant voxels. Views are through 
transparent scalp-frequency space, with pixel color representing the most significant 
voxel in the plane. Results were thresholded at p_clust = .001 and interpreted at the 
cluster level. Brain image in transverse view is representative. (a) T-contrast of eye open 
> closed condition revealing significant broadband clusters over frontotemporal areas, 
particularly in beta frequency. (b) T-contrast of eye closed > open condition revealing 
significant broadband clusters over occipito-parietal areas, particularly in beta (midline) 




Based on the above models, a between-subjects flexible factorial model was created with 
factors Group and Eyes and subjected to a group main effect F-test. This model revealed 
group differences in the left-parietal region in beta frequency (16hz to 22hz), P_FWE = 
.008, and in frontal midline in beta frequency (16Hz to 22Hz) at P_FWE = .015. The 
direction of these effects was explored through T-tests. Analyst > Insightful scans 
revealed clusters of significantly greater activity in mid-frontal beta (P_FWE = .034, 
16Hz to 20Hz), and right-frontal beta (P_FWE = .025, 14Hz to 22Hz; marginally 
significant in F-test, p=.052; Figure 4a). Insightful > Analyst scans revealed clusters of 
significantly greater activity in left-parietal beta (P_FWE = .008, 16hz to 20hz), and a 
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Figure 4: SPM significance maps of flexible factorial contrast for group main effect. 
Sagittal, coronal and transverse views of significant voxels. Views are through 
transparent scalp-frequency space, with pixel color representing the most significant 
voxel in the plane. Results were thresholded at p_clust = .001 and interpreted at the 
cluster level. All significant clusters are in beta frequency. Brain image in transverse 
view is representative. (a) T-contrast of analytic > insightful group revealing two 
significant beta-frequency clusters over midline-frontal and right-frontal cortex. (b) T-
contrast of insightful > analytic group revealing one significant beta frequency cluster 





3.7: Regional Relationships and Transient Hypofrontality 
A correlation analysis was performed to explore the relationships between the significant 
cluster regions. RS data from days 1 through 3 (including both eye conditions) was 
averaged within-subject, and power values were extracted from the scalp-frequency 
locations of the peak voxel of each of the three significant regions (left-temporal alpha 
was explored in a separate analysis, below). The three regions were significantly 
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correlated, positively between the two frontal clusters and negatively between both 
frontal regions and left-parietal (Figure 5a).  
3.8: Predictive Modeling 
To determine if the three significant clusters contributed independently or if their 
correlations were causal to the I/A ratio, we explored whether regression on multiple 
predictors and their interactions better characterized the anagram I/A ratio data than any 
one region independently. In a stepwise multiple regression we found the most 
parsimonious model of anagram I/A ratio included right-frontal and left-parietal regions 
while excluding mid-frontal. Interaction terms between the three regions were not 
significant. The final model correlated with Anagram I/A ratio with r_adjusted = .777 and 
RMSE = .819 (Figure 5b). This correlation and RMSE outperforms a model using only 
the parietal peak voxel, r_adjusted = .693, RMSE = .921. 
To demonstrate robustness, the final stepwise regression model was subjected to K-fold 
cross validation with 8 folds. Over 100 iterations, the average RMSE of the K-fold model 
increased only slightly, to .885. By contrast, a similar cross-validated model trained on 
only the parietal peak voxel predictor resulted in an RMSE of .941. The RMSE is in the 
units of the outcome variable (I/A ratio). The standard deviation of the I/A ratios included 
in the 32 subject analysis was 1.23. Therefore, using the two-predictor model, a subject’s 
I/A ratio can be predicted to within .66 standard deviations. 
The model was additionally trained using values from sensor space. The CP3 and F10 
electrodes were closest to the peak voxel locations of the parietal and right-frontal 
clusters, respectively. The power spectra of these electrodes was averaged across all days 
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and eye condition within-subject, and frequency power at the peak voxel frequencies 
(both 20Hz) was extracted. A model retrained on this data with the same cross-validation 
methodology as described above resulted in r_adjusted = .30, RMSE = 1.05, or .85 
standard deviations. 
To test the generalizability of our model we additionally applied it to prediction of day-3 
CRA I/A ratios over the 32 subjects included in the original analysis. Despite the lower 
stability of CRA I/A ratios and differences between the tasks, our model is still a 





Figure 5: Relationships between predictor clusters and performance of model 
(A) Schematic representation of intercorrelations between the significant clusters (lower 
boxes), and the correlation of each cluster independently with the IA ratio (upper boxes). 
Blue and red connectors indicate positive and negative correlations, respectively. (B) I/A 
ratio predicted by two-cluster stepwise linear regression model versus observed (actual) 
I/A ratio. Multiple linear regression model equation includes only the left-parietal and 
right-frontal clusters as predictors. Regression coefficient of MLR model is a significant 
improvement over any individual predictor (r=.78). 
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3.9: Model Generalizability 
To assess the generalizability of our model, we tested its performance on a dataset with 
these subjects reincluded (42 subjects total). This test revealed that the model 
significantly predicts I/A ratio, r=.406, p=.021, RMSE=1.02. Therefore, our left-parietal - 
right-frontal model generalizes, with some loss of accuracy, to the full range of I/A ratios. 
We additionally tested whether a new model, retrained on the three predictors across all 
subjects, would better predict the I/A ratio than our original model. A stepwise multiple 
regression eliminated both mid-frontal and right-frontal predictors, retaining only the left-
parietal predictor, but was slightly less accurate in describing I/A ratio than our original 
model, r=.377, p=.033, 100 iteration average k-fold (8 folds) validated RMSE=1.10. Our 
original two predictor model is thus slightly better at predicting I/A ratio across all 
participants. 
3.10: Left-temporal Alpha 
While left-temporal alpha was not significantly correlated with anagram I/A ratio, 
correlation with CRA I/A ratio was highly significant, r=.690, p<.0001. Therefore, we 
reran the stepwise multiple regression against CRA I/A ratio including the left-temporal 
alpha peak voxel as a predictor. The stepwise model rejected all predictors except left-
temporal alpha, achieving a correlation of r=.690, p<.0001, 100 iteration average k-fold 
(8 folds) validated RMSE=.952. When interactions are allowed, stepwise multiple 
regression includes predictors left-temporal alpha and its interaction with left-parietal 
beta, which is not independently significant, r=.766, p<.0001, 100 iteration average k-
fold (8 folds) validated RMSE=.911; slightly more predictive than the linear model alone. 
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3.11: Alternative SPM Regression Analysis 
To investigate the nature of the middle quintile in relation to the insightful and analytic 
groups, a between-subjects SPM regression analysis including all subjects with 
acceptable behavioral and EEG data (n=42) was performed with factors Group and Eyes, 
and subjected to a Group main effect F-test. This model revealed no significant clusters, 
although non-significant clusters in left-parietal beta and right-frontal beta were 
prominent at P_FWE = .084 and P_FWE=.165, respectively. 
To better explain the effects, fitted responses of this model are plotted at the peak voxel 
locations of the parietal and right-frontal clusters from the main 32 subject analysis 
(Figure 6). These plots reveal that the middle quintile group had substantially higher 
activity in the parietal cluster than would be predicted by the 32 subject analysis – as high 
as the most insightfully-biased subjects. Results for right-frontal cluster were less clear, 
and generally follow a pattern of increasing variance with decreasing I/A ratio; however, 
these results are for only one voxel and may not be representative of the overall pattern. 
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Figure 6: 32 versus 42 subject fitted responses at parietal and right-frontal peak voxels. 
I/A ratio versus intensity at selected peak voxels. Gray dots are intensity values; black 
dots are fitted (predicted) responses by linear regression. Intensity is unitless. (A) 42 
subject model fitted responses at right-frontal cluster peak voxel, approximate middle 
quintile in red outline. (B) 32 subject model fitted responses at right-frontal cluster peak 
voxel (C) 42 subject model fitted responses at parietal cluster peak voxel, approximate 





3.12: Weak versus Extreme Cognitive Style 
If subjects with a weak bias towards one or the other strategy have qualitatively different 
RS profiles from insightfuls and analytics, these differences might be related to weak 
versus extreme cognitive style, as opposed to the particular direction of style bias. To test 
this theory, a flexible factorial model including factors group and eyes was created with 
groups formed from the 16 most strategically unbiased versus the 16 most biased 
subjects. This analysis revealed no significant clusters. 
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3.13: Effect of Data Length 
Isolation of the traitlike RS activity associated with strategy selection bias may not 
require all four sessions. We performed the same model creation and K-fold analysis 
procedure described above on data averaged over different numbers of RS sessions, from 
one to four. RMSE follows an exponential decline as more RS sessions are included, 
demonstrating the effect of averaging on the “state” noise components of RS EEG (Table 
4). Practical improvement in predictive power is not gained with more than 3 or 4 
sessions, except potentially in individuals with unstable RS activity. 
In sum, our results describe an insight / analytic “cognitive style axis”, and more 
generally demonstrate that it is possible to isolate traitlike variation in resting-state 
recordings and use multi-dimensional predictors to titrate estimates of personality factors 
and cognitive style. With refinement, this technique may have specific value as an 
applied predictor of cognitive problem solving style and associated phenomena. The 
richness of the traitlike RS EEG signal suggests that the trait-activity isolation method 
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Table 4: Model improvement as a function of data length 
Root mean squared error (RMSE) of stepwise regression model (32s) with an increasing 
number of included sessions per subject. As additional sessions of resting state data are 
added to the within-subject averages from which power values are drawn, the RMSE of 
the model decreases. Practical improvement is not gained with more than 3 days of data. 
 
 RMSE 
Day 1 only 1.073 
Days 1 to 2 .922 
Days 1 to 3 .881 
Days 1 to 4 .875 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
4.1: Predictive Implications 
These results demonstrate consistent, trait resting-state differences between individuals 
who approach problems insightfully versus analytically, in data collected days to weeks 
before the grouping task. The results are considered below in the context of the anagram 
task and the insight / analytic ratio. However, the paradigm described for extracting trait-
like RS predictors of on-task cognitive features is also extensible to other cognitive 
features of interest. Fox, Spreng, Ellamil, Andrews-Hannah and Christoff (2015) 
commented “[…] different forms and content of mind-wandering entail at least partially 
dissociable neural correlates. […] the investigation of specific functional roles for the 
various brain networks and regions involved has undoubtedly begun in earnest.” The 
paradigm described here may serve as a general mechanism for advancing that goal. The 
deep linkage between RS and task suggests future applications in which simple RS 
recordings could stand in as a simpler proxy for on-task measures and diagnostics. 
4.2: Variable Engagement in Mind-Wandering 
It is now well understood that subjects are not cognitively idle just because they have not 
been given an instruction. They produce “stimulus independent thought”, or mind-
wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Mind-wandering is the decoupling of 
attention from sensory input and task-related processing to episodic memory retrieval, 
planning and problem solving (Schooler, Smallwood, Christoff, Handy, & Reichle, 
2011). In the context of RS, mind-wandering is “spontaneous cognitive operations during 
conscious rest” (Laufs et al., 2003). Individuals vary in their propensity to engage in 
mind-wandering in daily life (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010), suggesting similar 
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variation in RS. Therefore, group RS differences could reflect different amounts of 
engagement in mind-wandering behavior. The propensity to produce mind-wandering 
may be related to ability to maintain vigilance or exogenous attention (Schooler et al., 
2011). Strength or flexibility of attention is also centrally implicated in behavioral 
differences in creative output and ability (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2003; Ansburg & 
Hill, 2003; Zabelina, O’Leary, Pornpattananangkul, Nusslock, & Beeman, 2015), and 
specifically in the I/A ratio (Wegbreit, Suzuki, Grabowecky, Kounios, & Beeman, 2012). 
Attentive faculties could act as a hidden variable that affects RS behavior, by how much 
mind-wandering occurs, and I/A ratio, by perception and processing of the stimuli. 
4.3: Approach to Resting State 
More subtly, although subjects in RS are not behaving differently, they may be thinking 
differently. Cognition during RS depends on ongoing cognitive and affective processes, 
and the focus of attention. This is well summarized by Laufs et al. (2003), who remarked 
that “the default mode of brain activity at rest has a specific functional connotation with 
cognitive and emotional processes revolving around the subject’s internal state.” The 
instructions in RS in this study were simply to “remain still and relaxed.” Subjects in a 
task-free period could choose any behavior between vigilant mindfulness and 
unconstrained mind-wandering (Fox et al., 2015). These opposing modes of thought 
(Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012; Dixon, Fox, & Christoff, 2014; Lebuda, 
Zabelina, & Karwowski, 2016) have been previously linked to I/A strategy selection in a 
study showing that greater self-reported trait mind-wandering predicted more CRA 
problems solved by insight, and that when instructed to use an analytic strategy, 
participants with higher scores of trait mindfulness were more accurate overall (Zedelius 
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& Schooler, 2015). Thus, RS differences could as easily arise from differences in 
interpretation of the instructions as from the amount of mind-wandering occurring, or raw 
ability to focus attention.  
One explanation for the link between mind wandering and insight is that release of 
attention from the problem, known as an “incubation period”, is necessary to admit new 
stimuli and memory retrieval essential to unconscious task-relevant processing (Schooler 
et al., 2011). However, this theory does not explain insight facilitation on short 
insight/analytic strategy tasks such as are used in Zedelius & Schooler (2015) and the 
present work, because these problems are (presumably) too short for meaningful impasse 
and mind wandering to occur. Thus, the RS predictors of strategy selection we observe 
are more likely to be a function of subjects’ basic approach to task-free periods. 
4.4: Considerations for Interpretation of Scalp-Frequency Results 
EEG has high temporal and frequency resolution. In the present analyses, all observed 
contrast differences are in beta frequency. Beta is known as a signature of active, higher-
order cognitive processing (Ray & Cole, 1985) linked to perception, motor control 
(Sherman et al, 2016) and perceptual feature binding (Jaušovec & Jaušovec, 2000). There 
also exists evidence for a more general and unifying role for beta oscillations in 
“maintaining the status quo” (Engel & Fries, 2010). Beta oscillations may reflect a region 
increasing its resistance to input, in order to maintain the current state or processing task. 
This interpretation would fit with a theory of cognitive style as a persistent attentional 
scope or mode of processing that might shape other aspects of ongoing thought. 
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Interpreting the scalp locations of the observed group differences is complicated by the 
low spatial resolution of EEG. Electrochemical voltage changes in a particular area of 
cortex (a “source”) spread effectively instantaneously to all areas of the scalp, falling off 
in amplitude with the inverse of the distance from the generator to the recording site. The 
scalp, skull, and other intervening tissues further smear the scalp voltage profile. 
Therefore, scalp EEG is a spatial average of a large number of diffuse signals. Because 
adjacent areas of the brain may have very different functions and connections, this spatial 
imprecision makes functional interpretation difficult. Therefore, it is desirable to unmix 
scalp EEG signals to a more precise approximation of the original sources (source 
localization or “the inverse problem”). However, most source localization techniques 
depend on EEG phase information, which is lost during scalp-frequency transformation 
such as is applied in this work. Localization analysis is the primary direction for future 
work on this analysis (see 5.1: Future Work), as most functional hypotheses depend on a 
finer spatial resolution than is achieved with a raw scalp topography. 
4.5: DMN/DAN Modulation 
Mind-wandering is positively correlated with default mode network (DMN) activity 
(Mason et al., 2007). If insightfuls and analytics engage in RS mind-wandering at 
different rates, we would expect to observe differential recruitment of the DMN. Our data 
are partially consistent with this theory, assuming that the peak voxels of the significant 
clusters generally approximate the scalp location of the true sources. Frontal beta in 
medial and inferior regions could indicate increased DMN and mind-wandering activity 
(Christoff et al., 2016), but these regions are also implicated in externally directed 
cognition (Dixon et al., 2014). Right inferior frontal areas are also strongly linked to 
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inhibition. Although this linkage has mostly been explored through active (go-no-go) 
tasks rather than resting state, there is evidence that the inferior frontal region also 
responds to endogenous signals related to cognitive control (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 
2014), such as might be required to “stop thinking.” These signals are primarily encoded 
in beta band (Swann et al., 2009). Midline frontal beta oscillations have also been linked 
to top-down endogenous cognitive control of attention (Van de Vijver, Ridderinkhof, & 
Cohen, 2011). The superior parietal area is implicated in endogenous, sustained top-down 
orienting of attention toward current goals as a component of the dorsal attention network 
(DAN; Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008). In the present analysis the group variable did 
not significantly interact with eye condition as might be expected of an attentional 
modulation, but in fact this is consistent with evidence that the DAN is functionally 
connected even in eyes-closed resting-state (Fox, Corbetta, Snyder, Vincent, & Raichle, 
2006; Patriat, Molloy, Meier, Kirk, & Nair, 2013). However, there are also broad 
implications of parietal function in episodic memory retrieval (Wagner, 2005). Notably, 
medial-frontal and fronto-parietal regions are among areas found most predictive of 
subject identity (that is, expressing the most idiosyncratic yet consistent cross-session 
activity) in prior studies of RS (Finn, et al., 2015). 
Clearly, spatial interpretation without Laplacian or other source-localization is 
adventurous. “Raw” EEG scalp signals are not only diffuse, but depending on the 
orientation of the structure or section of gyri that produces them, may appear at some 
distance from the actual generator or on the opposite side of the head (“paradoxical 
lateralization”). Even without these complications, it is not possible to support whether 
our data are more consistent with a DMN or DAN modulation without better localization. 
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The distance between parietal and frontal clusters, and their anticorrelation (see below), 
makes it clear that they originate from separable sources. Although it is not possible to 
say certainly without localization, it is likely that these sources originate in the lobes 
(parietal and frontal) they appear over. Thus, at present our results could inform theories 
that rely on only the broad functionality of each lobe. 
Correlation between frontal regions is consistent with findings that medial frontal cortex 
cognitive control function is linked to inferior frontal structures tractographically (Li et 
al., 2013) and in active task paradigms (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2004). In the context of the broad inhibitory function of the frontal cortex, 
the anti-correlation between power in frontal and parietal regions suggests that the 
insightful/analytic dynamic may be partly traceable to cognitive control that can inhibit or 
release parietal activity. This interpretation supports the Matched Filter Hypothesis 
(MFH) advanced by Chrysikou, Weber and Thompson-Schill (2013). “Matched filter” is 
a signal processing term referring to a filter that ideally parses signal from noise. In the 
MFH, prefrontal cortex (PFC) cognitive control is conceptualized as a filter that acts on 
low level information, such as perceptual stimuli or subconscious associations. While 
many tasks benefit from increased cognitive control to screen out irrelevant data, tasks 
that are more implicit and creative may in fact rely on low-level information. For ideal 
performance, the PFC filter must be “matched” to the task demands. CRA’s are a salient 
example of a task that relies on weak associations. Insight solutions to CRAs are 
theorized to rely on simultaneous activation of the weak associates of each of the three 
stimulus words, and subsequent discovery of their overlap. Anagram insight solutions 
may rely on unconscious parallel processing of possible letter and bigram positions 
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(Novick & Sherman, 2003) which are weak “associations” of the stimulus string. Because 
solution by insight relies on these weak associations, it can only be achieved when PFC 
filtering is relaxed.  
The MFH is supported by studies showing that reduced involvement of the PFC due to 
dual-task demands, frontal lesions, disorders and age (childhood) can improve 
performance on tasks requiring bottom-up, data-driven implicit processing, as opposed to 
more explicit tasks that utilize rulesets and working memory. This dichotomy echoes the 
concept of cognitive style. With further localization and network analysis, the results 
presented here could extend MFH to subjects’ resting-state cognition. This would imply 
that creative and analytic “types” of people engage different levels of PFC filtering at 
rest. This is consistent with earlier studies advancing transient hypofrontality as a main 
mechanism of creative thought (Dietrich, 2002), but suggests that hypofrontality is partly 
chronic and related to individual traits. 
4.6: Left Temporal Alpha 
Although the SPM results in the left temporal alpha cluster were not significant, the 
scalp-frequency location of this cluster is intriguing. First, we found that left temporal 
alpha peak voxel power significantly correlated with each of the three other significant 
regions, positively with left-parietal and negatively with both frontal regions. This result 
links the exploratory left-temporal alpha result to the insightful > analytic state. 
Creativity theory has long postulated a special role for the right hemisphere (Kounios & 
Beeman, 2014), and prior work on CRAs has revealed a burst of temporal gamma in right 
anterior superior temporal lobe at the moment of solution (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). 
Thus it was interesting to explore whether any correlation existed between the I/A ratio of 
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the tasks in this experiment, and the marginally significant RS left temporal alpha cluster. 
Since alpha is primarily implicated as an inhibitory frequency (Klimesch, Sauseng, & 
Hanslmayr, 2007), such a result might indicate a right-dominant temporal lobe state. 
4.7: Alternate SPM analyses 
The SPM results and stepwise multiple regression model were based on a dataset with 
subjects in the middle quintile of anagram I/A ratios removed. Subjects with middling I/A 
ratios (who thus do not strongly rely on one strategy or the other) might represent an a 
different “fast switching” type that quickly moved between insight and analytic modes. 
These subjects could exhibit a different resting state pattern which not lying on a 
continuum with highly insightful and analytic solvers. Regardless of the underlying 
phenomena, subjects with middling I/A ratios could easily have been included in either 
group with a few more insight or analytic solutions, and their inclusion weakens the 
group separation (Kozhevnikov, 2007). Ideally, an inflection point or “transition zone” 
would be identified which defined “no style” individuals from both insightfuls and 
analytics. An obvious candidate is the value log I/A ratio = 1, where the numbers of 
solutions by each method are equal. However, it is not clear that an “average” solver 
should have a log ratio of 1; insight or analysis might be more prevalent as a solving 
method, defining the other extreme. Since little is known about cognitive style, the actual 
distribution of these inflection points is unknown. Alternatively, if I/A ratio does not 
contain critical inflection thresholds as a proxy for cognitive style, then a continuous 
regression including the middle quintile might be more appropriate. 
However, an alternate version of the SPM analysis was performed using all subjects with 
acceptable data (including the middle quintile) as a regression on I/A ratio to explore 
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whether the results depended on removal of the middle quintile. No significant clusters 
resulted from this analysis. It is not possible to support a detailed interpretation of this 
null result, but it is in line with the assumption that the middle quintile subjects’ resting 
state pattern is not on the same continuum as the extreme subjects.  
A related question is whether the most biased subjects have a different pattern of resting-
state activity than the most unbiased. This explores any predictors of the presence of a 
cognitive style versus individuals who are agnostic. This strikes at the concept of 
“cognitive flexibility”. For instance, individuals with no cognitive style might be 
engaging in fast set-switching between a creative versus analytic mindset. However, an 
analysis repartitioning the subjects in this manner found no significant voxels. This is an 
interesting avenue for future exploration. Many high-level treatments of the phenomenon 
of creativity suggest that alternating between a highly divergent and open frame of mind 
that generates possibilities, and a structured or convergent mindset in which those 
possibilities are rigorously tested or value-assessed is a possible mechanism for creative 
genius, especially of the type encompassing long creative projects which involve both 
technical and creative aspects. Ultimately, an extremely insightful or analytic mindset 
may not be the most productive, although in the context of this study it is the most 
informative. 
Ideally, a three-way comparison between insightful, middle, and analytic subjects would 
be performed to clarify these questions. This study did not have enough subjects to 
achieve sufficient power for such an analysis. 
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4.8: Predictive Modeling 
The stepwise predictive model exceeded the predictive power of any of the regional 
predictors by a significant margin. Given SPM scalp-frequency maps, the cross-validated 
model could predict I/A ratio to within .66 standard deviations – given only sensor data, 
it could predict I/A ratio to within .85 standard deviations. With future improvements, 
this opens the door to assessment of cognitive style without laborious cognitive tasks, and 
to the potential generalization of the cognitive style fronto-parietal predictor to other 
creative tasks. It should be noted that these results were obtained with a 32 subject model 
(middle quintile removed). With the middle quintile re-added, the predictive stepwise 
regression model was still fairly accurate, but it is questionable whether the inclusion of 
these subjects in the model is appropriate given the failure to observe significant SPM 
clusters at those locations with these subjects re-included. The middle quintile remains an 
unexplained source of variance. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated a technique for isolation of trait resting-state neural 
signatures of cognitive style. General considerations for designing and implementing 
investigations of other cognitive traits are summarized with an overview of an EEG 
processing and analysis pipeline for preparing and investigating these data. The analysis 
of insight/analytic cognitive style revealed group differences over frontal and parietal 
lobes that occur days to weeks before the grouping task, and thus are predictive rather 
than descriptive of the variance in anagram solution style bias. The lack of source 
localization makes the specific pattern of these results difficult to interpret. However, at a 
lobe-level, the spatial results are in agreement with the Matched Filter Hypothesis, and 
could represent differential levels of chronic executive inhibition during resting state in 
insightfuls and analytics. Finding these signals in isolations of trait-like resting state 
suggests that these differences in executive inhibition could be deep and influential to 
individuals’ approaches to a wide domain of problem solving. This is supported by the 
applicability of the fronto-parietal model to CRA data as well as anagrams. 
5.1: Future Directions 
Replication with a greater subject count would make possible a more detailed 
consideration of subjects in the middle quintile of the insight/analytic distribution. In the 
future, replication with a different insight/analytic judgment task would help to generalize 
these results. 
Source localization and network analysis are important for improving the specificity of 
the conclusions of this work. Efforts to complete these analyses are underway. Because 
scalp-frequency transformation of the type used here destroys phase information, an 
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alternative Laplacian transformation will be used (Nunez et al., 1994). Because EEG 
signals fall off nonlinearly as a function of their distance from the source generator, scalp 
areas where voltage changes rapidly are likely to approximate the true sources. Laplacian 
transformation calculates the second spatial derivative of scalp-frequency power, or the 
rate of change of the rate of change in EEG scalp power. This is a form of high-pass 
spatial filter. The Laplacian enhances focal voltage changes and attenuates the smoother 
signal change that is likely to represent uninformative smearing and signal diffusion. The 
Laplacian does not provide the three dimensional source approximations that model-
based techniques like LORETTA and beamforming do. However, it relies on very few 
assumptions compared to model-based methods. Laplacian transformation and SPM 
analysis will be performed on these data in the near future. 
Network analysis will be performed via the MultiVariate Granger Causality (MVGC) 
toolbox (Barnett & Seth, 2014). Because granger causality analysis is biased by 
highpassing at even low values (.1Hz), alternate preprocessing has been developed for 
this analysis. As an alternative to highpassing, linear detrending is used to remove slow 
drift (Delorme et al., 2011). The Cleanline plugin is used to remove line-noise as an 
alternative to lowpassing (Mullen, 2012). Standard preprocessing as described in the 
main methods followed, with the exception that all gross-artifact identification and 
rejection was performed automatically. The results of this analysis may shed light on the 
network connectivity between right frontal and left parietal lobes in solvers with different 
cognitive styles, and provide additional evidence for or against integration of these results 
with the matched filter hypothesis. 
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This work supports the role of resting-state recording as a source of predictors for 
psychological and cognitive style variables. The methods described are applicable to 
uncovering resting-state predictors of any cognitive style exposed by a similar free-
strategy problem. Resting state analysis may develop to encompass a personal diagnostic 
that can be used to assess many dimensions of individual differences without response 
bias through quick and non-invasive neural recording. Future work should explore 
advanced machine-learning classification algorithms to form more accurate and detailed 
predictions about cognitive style from rich scalp-frequency EEG statistical parametric 
maps, rather than peak voxel intensities. 
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Neither 104 0.17 -0.05 
Neither 106 0.19 0.61 
Neither 114 0.22 1.03 
Neither 117 0.57 -0.49 
Neither 118 0.32 1.21 
Neither 126 0.36 0.25 
Neither 203 0.28 -1.79 
Neither 209 0.52 0.41 
Neither 216 0.10 1.03 
Neither 222 0.55 0.27 
Analytic 102 -0.56 -1.18 
Analytic 103 -0.19 -0.30 
Analytic 105 -0.93 0.14 
Analytic 108 0.09 -1.15 
Analytic 110 -0.02 -0.41 
Analytic 111 -0.85 1.18 
Analytic 115 -0.15 -0.84 
Analytic 120 -0.46 0.27 
Analytic 123 -0.81 0.03 
Analytic 124 -0.85 -1.10 
Analytic 204 -0.28 0.22 
Analytic 210 -0.33 0.30 
Analytic 212 -0.30 0.16 
Analytic 214 -0.52 -1.39 
Analytic 220 0.04 -2.08 
Analytic 225 -0.10 -0.22 
Insight 107 1.42 2.15 
Insight 109 3.54 1.63 
Insight 112 1.21 0.13 
Insight 122 3.23 2.11 
Insight 125 1.25 0.00 
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